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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian
disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men
above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian
private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference type regres-
sions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability
enrollment of 6 to 7.4 percentage points and an increase in employment of
1.6 to 3.4 percentage points. On the other hand, the policy change had
important spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance
program. Specifically, the share of individuals receiving unemployment
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1 Introduction
The Disability Insurance (DI) program is the largest social insurance program in
most industrialized countries. In OECD countries, total expenditures on disabil-
ity benefits account for approximately 2.5 percent of GDP on average (OECD
(2009)). While the DI program is designed to provide income replacement in the
case of a permanent loss of earnings capacity due to poor or deteriorating health,
there are concerns that the DI program distorts work incentives and is used as a
gateway for early retirement. Understanding the incentive effects of the DI pro-
gram is important to assess the value of the insurance provided and to evaluate
the cost and benefits of policy measures that try to reduce the disincentives to
work.
There is a substantial U.S. based literature on the work disincentives of the DI
program.1 However, the behavioral response of changes in the disability insurance
has been difficult to estimate because all workers face identical program rules,
making it difficult to find a suitable counterfactual. This paper adds to this
literature by exploiting a policy change in the Austrian DI program that tightened
eligibility criteria for DI benefits of older workers close to retirement age. Since
the change in law affected only a subset of workers while leaving nearly identical
individuals completely unaffected, the impact of stricter eligibility criteria for DI
benefits can be estimated using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy.
More specifically, the first objective of this paper is to determine how stricter
eligibility criteria for DI benefits affect employment and enrollment into the DI
program. A second key question is whether a tightening in eligibility rules leads
to increases in enrollment in other programs.2 Accounting for such spillover
1For an excellent overview of the literature see Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Autor
and Duggan (2006).
2Spillover effects between government programs haven been examined in other contexts by
Garrett and Glied (2000), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), Bound et al. (2004), and Duggan et al.
(2007).
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effects is potentially important for designing effective policies. In the present
context, for example, the positive employment effect of more rigorous eligibility
criteria may be small, to the extent that individuals can claim benefits from the
unemployment insurance (UI) or sickness insurance (SI) instead.
Since the early 1980s the fraction of the working-age population receiving
DI benefits in Austria has remained relatively constant at 8 percent, which is
approximately twice as high as in the U.S. The high rate of disability receipt in
Austria is mainly due to a relaxation in DI eligibility criteria starting at age 55.
Specifically, below the age threshold an individual is generally considered disabled
if a medically determinable impairment reduces the ability to work by more than
50 percent relative to a healthy person with comparable education in any type of
work in the economy. Above the age-threshold of 55 the same individual qualifies
for disability benefits if the ability to work is reduced by more than 50 percent
relative to a healthy person with comparable education in a similar occupation.
Thus, as older workers are only compared to the set of workers in their occupation,
disability enrollment accelerates dramatically beginning at age 55.
With the aim of improving the fiscal health of the public pension system, the
Austrian government implemented the Structural Adjustment Act on September
1, 1996, which restricted eligibility for early retirement benefits and introduced a
bonus/malus system to penalize early retirement and encourage continued labor
force participation. The most important change of all, however, was an increase
in the age at which conditions for DI benefits are relaxed, from 55 to 57. Because
DI enrollment has been particularly high among older men, this increase took
effect only for men, while eligibility conditions for women were left unaffected.
Using administrative data from all private sector workers in Austria, the re-
sults from the empirical analysis suggest that enrollment in the disability insur-
ance program responded significantly to the tightening of the eligibility criteria.
Following the change in law, the share of disability recipients among 55-56 year
old men decreased permanently by 6 to 7.4 percentage points. The drop in dis-
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ability enrollment is countered by a substantial increase in employment of 1.6 to
3.4 percentage points, after the change in law became operative. On the other
hand, the estimates suggest that the policy change led to an increase in unem-
ployment of 3.5 to 3.9 percentage points and to an increase in sickness of 0.7
percentage points.
The magnitude of work disincentives of the disability insurance depends on
the accessibility and generosity of DI benefits. Earlier studies in the literature
relied on cross-sectional variation in potential DI benefits relative to previous
earnings to estimate the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to
benefit generosity (see, e.g., Parsons (1980)). Since the potential DI replacement
rate is decreasing in past earnings, the finding that workers with higher potential
DI replacement rates are more likely to seek benefits may simply reflect differences
in the underlying tastes for work. More recent studies have therefore tried to
estimate the behavioral impact of DI benefits using other methodologies. Bound
(1989) uses the labor supply behavior of rejected applicants as an upper bound
estimate of the work capacity of DI beneficiaries. His main result suggests that
at most one third of DI recipients would have worked had they not received DI
benefits. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) confirm this estimate using more recent
data. Exploiting regional variation in DI benefits across Canadian provinces,
Gruber (2000) estimates an elasticity of labor force non-participation with respect
to DI benefits of 0.28 to 0.36. In this study the level of benefits remains largely
constant over the sample period and what changes is the access to disability
benefits.
Since disability status is only imperfectly observable, determining whether
program claimants are truly disabled is difficult. Under stricter screening of ap-
plicants and tighter eligibility rules seeking DI benefits is less attractive. The
effect of screening stringency on labor force participation has been estimated for
the U.S. by Gruber and Kubik (1997) and Autor and Duggan (2003). Using
variation in denial rates across states as a proxy for screening stringency, Gruber
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and Kubik (1997) find that stricter screening leads to a significant reduction in
labor force non-participation among older men. Autor and Duggan (2003) use
the liberalization of the disability determination process in 1984 and an unforseen
increase in the earnings replacement rate to explore the impact of the supply of
disability benefits on the labor force participation of low-skilled workers. They es-
timate that the sum of these forces doubled the labor force exit propensity of high
school dropouts. More recently, De Jong et al. (2010) use a controlled experiment
in which some regional DI offices in the Netherlands were instructed to screen
applicants more intensively. They find a significant reduction in DI applications
in the regions with more intensified screening. Contrary to this paper, they find
that long-term sickness absenteeism decreases with intensified screening. This
results is driven by long-term sickness absenteeism being a precondition for DI
benefits. Therefore, unlike in Austria, the SI program acts as a complement to
the DI program rather than as a substitute.
There have been two recent papers estimating the labor supply response of
changes in eligibility criteria for DI benefits. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008)
focus on a subset of DI applicants in the U.S. whose disability determination is
based on the applicant’s age and conclude that the DI program has only a modest
impact on labor force participation. This paper estimates a much larger labor
supply response, which may reflect difference in characteristics of the marginal en-
rollee in the U.S. versus Austria, and extends on their work by providing evidence
that stricter access to DI benefits increases enrollment in other social insurance
programs. Moreover, since the policy change studied in this paper tightens eligi-
bility criteria for all applicants in a certain age group, the empirical analysis is
not restricted to applicants only.
Karlström et al. (2008) exploit a policy change in Sweden that tightened
eligibility rules for older workers. As the new eligibility rules were announced 2
years prior to their implementation, there was a large anticipation effect, which
causes an upward bias in the estimates. To address this issue, they exclude all
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observations from the year the policy was announced to the year the policy was
implemented. Since the policy change studied here was announced only a few
months before its implementation, the anticipation effect was small. Unlike in
this paper, they find that the stricter eligibility criteria led to only small decline
in DI enrollment and had no effect on employment. Again this difference could
be attributed to the difference in characteristics of the marginal DI applicant
in Sweden versus Austria. In particular, since the reform studied by Karlström
et al. (2008) applied only to those 60 and over, affected individuals are older and
potentially less healthy on average.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Austria’s social insurance
programs and the 1996 reform in the DI program. Section 3 summarizes the data
and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the identification strategy.
Section 5 presents the results. Finally, section 6 draws conclusions.
2 Background
2.1 Social Insurance Programs in Austria
There are three important social insurance programs in Austria that provide in-
come replacement in the case of a separation from the labor market for economic
or health reasons: disability insurance (DI), sickness insurance (SI), and unem-
ployment insurance (UI). Austria’s DI program covers all active labor market
participants, although different rules apply for the self-employed and civil ser-
vants. Once benefits are awarded, DI beneficiaries receive monthly payments
until return to work, medical recovery or death. DI claimants can continue work
provided that the earnings are below a certain threshold (360 Euros per month
in 2010). About 15 percent of DI recipients continue work. Because criteria for
disability classification are relaxed for the elderly, the DI program has played an
important role in early retirement. Since men are first eligible for old-age pensions
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at age 60 compared to 55 for women, disability enrollment is disproportionately
high among older men. In 2008 61 percent of new male DI recipients and 31
percent of new female DI recipients were older than 55.
DI benefits are subject to income and payroll taxation. The calculation of DI
benefits is identical to that of retirement benefits and depends on the assessment
basis and the pension coefficient. The assessment basis is determined by the av-
erage earnings of the best 15 years, after applying an earnings cap to earnings
in each year. The pension coefficient corresponds to the percentage of the as-
sessment basis that is received in the disability pension. The pension coefficient
increases with the number of insurance years, which comprise both contributing
years (periods of employment, including sickness, and maternity leave) and qual-
ifying years (periods of unemployment, military service, or secondary education).
Because older applicants had more time to accumulate insurance years, DI re-
placement rates tend to increase with age. As shown in the first column of Table
1, the average net replacement rate for males in the age group 49-50 is 54.5 per-
cent compared to 62.9 percent in the age group 55-56. Younger workers therefore
have less of an incentive to seek DI benefits, although applicants under age 50
(age 57 since 1993) qualify for a special increment if their pension coefficient is
below 60 percent.
In case of a temporary illness, the employer continues to pay 100 percent of
earnings up to 12 weeks, depending on the length of service. Once the right to
full benefits by the employer has expired, individuals can claim benefits from the
Austrian sickness insurance, which covers all private-sector employees and indi-
viduals currently receiving unemployment benefits. Continued wage payments
and sickness benefits are both subject to taxation. As shown in the second col-
umn of Table 1, sickness benefits replace 64 percent of the last net wage up to
the same maximum that applies to disability benefits. On top, family allowances
are paid. The benefit duration is 52 weeks. However, depending on the funds
regulation, sickness benefits can be extended up to 78 weeks.
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The Austrian unemployment insurance system covers all employees except
for the self-employed who can participate on a voluntary basis. Regular unem-
ployment benefits depend on previous earnings and can be claimed for a limited
period based on the previous work history. Specifically, individuals with at least
1 year of employment in the past 2 years receive 20 weeks of benefits, while those
who have paid unemployment insurance contributions for 3 years or more in the
last 5 years receive 30 weeks. Individuals in the age group 50 and older receive
52 weeks of benefits conditional on having worked for 9 years or more in the
last 15 years. Unemployment benefits are not taxed and replace around 55 per-
cent of the prior net wage (column 3 of Table 1). Individuals who exhaust their
regular unemployment benefits can apply for unemployment assistance. These
means-tested transfers last for an indefinite time period and can be at most 92%
of regular unemployment benefits.
Table 1
2.2 The 1996 Reform to DI Eligibility Criteria
To be eligible for DI benefits, applicants must suffer a health impairment that
will last for at least 6 months and must have, depending on age, accumulated
between 5 and 15 insurance years. Since applicants currently in the labor force are
eligible for DI benefits, the opportunity cost to seek DI benefits is lower in Austria
than in the U.S. system where non-employment is a pre-condition for disability
application. Therefore, DI applications may be more responsive to the business
cycle in Austria compared to the U.S., although labor market conditions play no
direct role in the award decision.3 The fraction of applicants rejected benefits is
approximately 50 percent and among those who reapply around 15 percent are
awarded benefits (OECD (2003)).
3See Autor and Duggan (2003) for the responsiveness of DI applications over the business
cycle in the U.S.
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As illustrated in Table 2, health eligibility criteria for DI benefits depend on
age and whether the applicant is classified as a blue or white collar worker. In
general, blue collar workers below age 55 are eligible for benefits if a medically
determinable impairment causes more than 50 percent of a reduction in the ability
to work relative to that of a healthy person with comparable education in any
reasonable occupation that the individual can carry out. According to the law,
an occupation is reasonable if there exist at least 100 jobs in the field (vacant
or occupied) in Austria (Wörister (1999)), i.e. individuals are expected to be
completely flexible as to changes in residence. Eligibility criteria for benefits are
relaxed for white collar workers below age 55 because requirements to change
occupation are lower. Specifically, conditional upon having worked in a similar
occupation for 7.5 years or more in the most recent 15 years, white collar workers
are classified as disabled if their ability to work has been reduced to less than 50
percent relative to that of a healthy person with comparable education in any
occupation that belongs to the same occupational group.
To eliminate legal differences with respect to the self-employed, the Austrian
government relaxed DI eligibility criteria for elderly private sector workers above
55 in 1981. Specifically, elderly applicants are classified as disabled if their abil-
ity to work has been reduced to less than 50 percent that of a healthy person
with comparable education in a similar occupation. An occupation is consid-
ered similar if the core requirements are identical: manual and mental demands,
amount of responsibility, posture, concentration, endurance, required care, and
stress level must be comparable (Wörister (1999)). Thus, as older workers are
only compared to the set of workers in their occupation, it is substantially easier
for them to qualify for benefits. As an example, consider a server who is unable
to carry dishes due to arthritis. Below the age threshold her disability applica-
tion will be rejected, given that she could still work as a cashier, for example.
Above the age threshold, however, she will be awarded a disability pension. As a
direct consequence, disability enrollment rises significantly at and above the age
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threshold.
Table 2
With the aim of improving fiscal health and fostering employment among
older workers, the Austrian Pension System underwent significant changes in
1993, 1996, and 2000. While the 1993 and 2000 reforms had little impact on
DI eligibility, the reform in 1996 reduced disability enrollment among the elderly
substantially by increasing the age threshold for easy access to DI benefits from
55 to 57.
The 1993 pension reform, which became effective on July 1, introduced a
bonus for retirement after the early retirement age and changed the assessment
basis from the last 15 years of earnings to the highest 15 years of earnings. Given
that wages generally rise with age, the later change had no effect on disability or
retirement pension benefits for most individuals.
In May 1996 the Austrian government enacted the Structural Adjustment
Act (Strukturanpassungsgesetz), which became effective on September 1, 1996.
The primary objective was to cut down on expenditures in the public pension
system, in order to satisfy the criteria for accession to the European Economic
and Monetary Union (see Mairhuber (2003)). Specifically, the reform increased
the number of contribution years required for the early retirement pension from
15 to 20, introduced a penalty for claiming benefits before the early retirement
age and raised the bonus for retirement after the early retirement age. Although
the new penalty for early retirement depended on age, the pension coefficient
did not vary substantially with retirement age and did not represent a significant
change to the pension coefficient before the 1996 reform.
Figure 1
The most important change of all, however, was the two-year increase in the
age, at which conditions for DI benefits are relaxed. Since disability enrollment
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is particularly high among older men, this increase only applied to men, while
leaving eligibility conditions for women unaffected. The consequences of this
policy change are seen in Figure 1, which plots the share of newcomers to the
disability rolls by age for men (left panel) and women (right panel) before and
after the policy change. As the Figure shows, in the period January 1994 to
August 1996 disability inflow peaked at age 55 for men and women. Following
the 1996 reform, the inflow rate for men at age 55 fell by 6 percentage points
and increased by 3 percentage points at age 57. For the other ages as well as for
women there is no significant change in the age distribution of newcomers to the
disability rolls, providing informal evidence that the other elements of the reform
had no effect on disability enrollment.
On May 23, 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that different DI
eligibility criteria for men and women would violate EU law. Therefore, on July
1, 2000, the Austrian government set the age at which conditions for disability
benefits are relaxed to 57 for both men and women. The 2000 pension reform
also gradually increased the minimum retirement age from 55 to 56.5 for women
and from 60 to 61.5 for men and raised the penalty for early retirement and the
bonus for retirement after the statutory retirement age.
2.3 Hypothesis
By tightening eligibility criteria, the 1996 Structural Adjustment Act decreased
the supply of disability benefits for older male workers aged 55 and 56. The
basic theory of how disability eligibility criteria affect labor supply is presented in
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) and Autor and Duggan (2003). Stricter eligibility
criteria affect the labor supply behavior of individuals by reducing the fraction
of the population who are eligible for disability benefits. Hence, the total share
of individuals who seek benefits should decrease because (1) fewer people are
awarded benefits and (2) the number of applicants declines due to self-screening
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(see Parsons (1991)).
In addition to the DI program the UI and SI program provide income replace-
ment in the case of a separation from the labor market for economic or health
reasons. These programs may influence the individuals’ response to changes in
the DI program. In particular, employed workers that would have qualified for DI
benefits under the relaxed eligibility criteria but do not under the strict criteria
may seek UI or SI benefits instead. Moreover, affected individuals need to wait
only two years (one year for men aged 56) before they reach the new eligibility
age at which conditions to be classified as disabled are relaxed. Hence, UI or SI
benefits may be used to bridge the time until the new eligibility age is reached.
Taken together, we expect to observe an increase in the UI and SI rate after
the policy reform because (1) there are less transitions from these programs into
DI and (2) more transitions from employment into these programs. We also
expect to observe an increase in employment because employed workers are less
likely to seek DI benefits. However, the positive effect on employment may be
small if most employed workers that are no longer eligible for DI benefits claim
UI or SI benefits instead.
3 Data
The data comes from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which is
described in detail by Zweimüller et al. (2009). The data contains information on
all private sector workers in Austria and has two attractive features. First, the
data records all employment, unemployment, sickness, disability and retirement
spells back to 1972, which permits to trace individuals over time and reconstruct
an individual’s entire labor market history. Second, even when very specific
subgroups are considered, sample sizes are large and effects can be estimated with
a high degree of precision. At the individual level the data provides information on
gender, age, experience, tenure, blue collar or white collar status, and the number
12
of contribution and insurance years. The data also contains some firm-specific
information such as region and industry affiliation. Information on applications
for DI benefits is unfortunately not recorded in the data. Therefore, it is not
possible to examine how much of the reform’s impact on DI enrollment is due to
more people being denied benefits under the stricter rules versus self-screening,
i.e. less people seeking DI benefits. Similarly, the data does not permit an
analysis of the reform’s impact on the composition of the beneficiary population
since the qualifying impairment of DI awardees is not known.
The main sample consists of all men aged 49-56 over the period 1991 to 2002
working in Austria. Individuals are observed on a quarterly basis for approxi-
mately 5 1/2 years before the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Act
(January 1991 to August 1996) and a period of about 6 1/2 years (September
1996 to December 2002) when the reform was in effect. However, the main focus
of the analysis lies on the years 1994 to 1999, given that both in 1993 and 2000
significant policy reforms became effective, which potentially had an impact on
labor supply.
The sample restrictions are as follows. From the initial sample with 307,572
individuals I exclude 2,201 individuals who spent more than one year as public
servants as they are covered by a separate pension system. In particular, public
employees have relaxed eligibility conditions for disability benefits at all ages,
which results in a high level of disability enrollment even at lower ages. For the
same reason I exclude 60,404 individuals who spent more than one year in self-
employment. Second, in order to isolate the effects of stricter eligibility criteria,
I also exclude 8,749 individuals with less than five contribution years since these
individuals are unlikely to satisfy the non-medical eligibility criteria for disability
benefits. The final sample has 236,218 individuals.
Table 3 reports summary statistics by age group before (January 1994 to
August 1996) and after the reform (September 1996 to December 1999). Except
for the number of insurance years (and therefore disability benefits), there are
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minor differences between the different age groups with respect to observable
characteristics. A comparison of the fraction of individuals in different labor
market states before and after the 1996 reform provides the first evidence on
the impact of the policy change. Specifically, in the treatment group, relative
to the comparison groups, the rate of disability declines considerably after the
Structural Adjustment Act became effective. This decline has been accompanied
by a substantial rise in registered unemployment. Similarly, the sickness and
employment rate has increased after the reform, while the residual category has
remained virtually unchanged.4
Table 3
4 Identification Strategy
The empirical strategy to evaluate the 1996 policy reform relies on a difference-
in-difference approach. The first difference is over time, as access to disability
benefits became stricter after 1996. The second difference is across groups; only
men aged 55 and 56 were directly affected by the new disability eligibility rules.
These individuals define the treated group. The definition of the comparison
group is crucial, as it should capture counterfactual labor market trends in the
absence of the policy change.
One potential comparison group would be all women aged 55 and 56. This
group is an inadequate comparison group because over the period under consider-
ation the labor force participation of older women generally increased. Thus, even
in the absence of the policy change, trends in employment differ by gender. More-
over, since the early retirement age for women is 55, the labor supply behavior
4Unemployment is defined as being registered at an unemployment office but these individ-
uals are not necessarily receiving regular unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance.
The residual category contains individuals that are not employed, registered as unemployed,
disabled, nor receive sickness benefits.
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of older women is affected by changes in the early retirement rules. Specifically,
the 1996 pension reform raised the number contribution years needed to qualify
for early retirement from 15 to 20, thereby restricting access to early retirement
benefits.
A better comparison group are men aged 53-54. Individuals in this age group
are a close substitute to the individuals directly affected by the 1996 reform. On
the other hand, forward-looking men in the age group 53-54 potentially adjust
their labor supply behavior as a consequence of the policy change. For example,
53-54 year old job losers may increase their search effort given that after the
reform they need to wait at least three years before they reach the new eligibility
age at which eligibility criteria for DI benefits are relaxed. The empirical analysis
will therefore also use men aged 49-50 and men aged 51-52 as comparison groups
because they are less likely to change their labor supply behavior.
Alternatively, the stricter eligibility conditions for DI benefits for the age
group 55-56 could feed back to the labor demand for the the age group 49-54
via general equilibrium effects. Specifically, the demand for workers below age 55
may decline if workers in the age group 55-56 remain in employment longer after
this policy change is in effect. Such spillover effects are likely to be small because
the age group 55-56 is much smaller in size compared to the age group 49-54. To
shed light on this concern, it will be instructive to compare labor supply trends
of the comparison groups before and after this policy change.
The difference-in-difference comparison is implemented by estimating regres-
sions of the following type:
yit = α + β Treatit + γ (Postt × Treatit) + λt +X ′itδ + εit (1)
where i denotes individual, t time, and yit is the outcome variable of interest. The
variable Treat is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if comparison)
to control for group-specific trends; Post is a dummy which is 0 before September
1996 and 1 after September 1996; λt is a time fixed effect to control for changes
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in macroeconomic conditions. The vector Xit is a set of individual or region spe-
cific characteristics to control for any observable differences that might confound
the analysis (blue collar status, experience, number of insurance years, previous
annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, industry and region
dummies, and regional GDP growth rate). The coefficient of interest is γ, which
measures the effect of stricter DI eligibility criteria on the treated group relative
to the comparison group, using variation over time. To explore the impact of the
policy reform over time, equation (1) is generalized by replacing (Postt×Treatit)
with a full set of treatment times year interaction terms:
yit = α + β Treatit +
2002∑
l=1991
γl (dl × Treatit) + λt +X ′itδ + εit (2)
where dl is a dummy that is 1 in year l and 0 otherwise. The pre-1996 inter-
action terms provide pretreatment specification test, although they may capture
possible anticipation effects. Equation (1) and (2) are estimated for men aged
49-50, 51-52, and 53-54 as comparison groups. The identifying assumption is
that there are no unobserved age-group-specific changes that (1) are correlated
with the policy change and (2) are correlated with age-group-specific changes in
the outcome variable. All observations are clustered at the individual level to
account for correlation within observations across time, which may result in an
underestimation of standard errors.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Evidence
To assess the impact of the change in disability eligibility criteria graphically,
Figure 2 plots labor supply trends in men for the age groups 49-50, 51-52, 53-54,
and 55-56 over time. As shown in the top left subfigure, after the change in
law the fraction of disabled individuals in the age group 55-56 starts to decline
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by almost 10 percentage points and stays fairly constant at the new level of 15
percent. As shown in the top right subfigure, in the years following the policy
change the unemployment rate of the treatment group starts rising by roughly 5
percentage points reaching a maximum of 15 percent. A similar pattern can be
observed for the SI rate (bottom left panel). For the age group 55-56 enrollment
into the SI program starts growing by around 1 percentage point after the reform.
Finally, the bottom right panel suggest that despite the large absorption effects
by the UI and SI programs, employment in the treatment group clearly increases
after the policy change took effect.
Figure 2
There is evidence of an anticipation effect because in the year of the reform the
disability rate increases for the age group 55-56 while employment and enrollment
into the SI program decreases. However, since the reform was made public only
in May 1996, individuals had little time to adjust their behavior and therefore
the magnitude of the anticipation effect is relatively small. For the comparison
groups trends in different labor market states are relatively stable over the whole
time period. This pattern suggests that the stricter eligibility criteria for the
treatment group had no indirect effect on the comparison groups.
Figure 3 reports DI enrollment by age for the years 1994 and 1999. Clearly,
after the reform fewer people receive disability benefits at ages 55 and 56. At
age 57 disability enrollment starts to catch up and returns roughly to the pre-
reform level at ages 58 and 59. Hence, although the Structural Adjustment Act
permanently reduces disability enrollment at ages 55 and 56, it seems that most
people merely postpone their application for disability benefits until they reach
the new eligibility age at which conditions to be classified as disabled are relaxed.
Figure 3
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5.2 Baseline Results
The first main set of results is summarized in Table 4, which shows the OLS
estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable is a dummy, which is equal
to 1 if an individual is in the state of interest and 0 otherwise. The pre period
in the base specification is January 1994 to August 1996 and the post period
is September 1996 to December 1999. These estimates are likely to be biased
due to the anticipation effect shown in Figure 2 and because most of the 56
year olds in 1997 still could access disability benefits under the relaxed rules
at age 55 in 1996. The last three columns of Table 4 therefore contain the
results for an alternative specification that excludes the years 1996 and 1997.
All estimates include controls for blue collar status, experience, insurance years,
annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of days spent
in sick leave through age 49, industry and region dummies, and regional GDP
growth rate. Annual earnings and average earnings over the best 15 years are
measured at age 49 and adjusted for inflation.
The first row shows that in the base specification the share of disability recip-
ients declined by 4.3 to 5.3 percentage points after this policy change, depending
on the comparison group. The decline is more pronounced and varies between
5.98 and 7.44 percentage points if the years 1996 and 1997 are excluded. As
shown in Table 4, the direct consequence of the decline in disability enrollment
was an increase in unemployment rate of 2.44 to 2.93 percentage points in the
base specification and 3.45 to 3.92 percentage points in the specification without
the years 1996 and 1997. Similarly, there is a significant increase in the SI rate
of around 0.47 to 0.70 percentage points, after the Structural Adjustment Act is
implemented. In spite of the spillover effects to the UI and SI program, employ-
ment increased by 1.04 to 2.34 percentage points in the base specification and
1.61 to 3.37 percentage points in the specification without the years 1996 and
18
1997.5
Classifying individuals receiving SI or UI benefits as part of the labor force,
the results in the last three columns of Table 4 suggest that this policy change
increased labor force participation of 55-56 year old men by 6.1 to 7.5 percentage
points. This estimate is considerably larger compared to existing studies. Chen
and van der Klaauw (2008) estimate that a relaxation in eligibility criteria at age
55 in the U.S. decreases labor force participation by 6 to 12 percentage points
for a group of “marginal” applicants whose disability determination is based on
vocational factors and age. However, since this group is relatively small, the
overall labor force participation of 55 year olds decreases much less. Karlström
et al. (2008) study a similar policy change in Sweden and find no effect on DI
inflow nor employment. These differences could be attributed to the difference
in characteristics of the marginal DI enrollee across countries.
Table 4
The estimates presented in Table 4 will be biased if the treatment group and
the comparison group have different labor supply tendencies. To shed light on
this concern, Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms
(equation (2)) for each of the three comparison groups over the full sample period
1991–2002. Each dot on the solid line is the coefficient of the interaction between
an indicator variable for year and treatment (a 95-percent confidence interval is
plotted by dotted lines). As shown in the top left panel, coefficients for disability
turn significantly negative after the reform is in effect. The estimated decrease is
persistent over time and comparable across different comparison groups. There
is some evidence for an anticipation effect in 1996. The top right and bottom left
panels indicate that the decline in disability enrollment led to a large increase in
5Equation (1) has also been estimated for the residual category (containing those that are
not employed, unemployed, disabled, nor receiving SI). The results are not presented because
the estimated effects are not significant independent of the comparison group.
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the UI and, to a lesser extent, in the SI rate. This finding suggests that these
programs act partly as substitutes for the DI program. In spite of these absorbtion
effects, there is a substantial increase in employment, as shown in the bottom
right panel of figure 4. In all four panels the estimated coefficients fluctuate
around 0 before 1996 thereby providing evidence that the empirical strategy is
not simply picking up long-run trends in differences between comparison and
treatment group.
Figure 4
The overall effects shown in Table 4 can either be the results of changes in
the inflow into a certain state; or changes in the persistence in a certain state; or
both. To shed light on the importance of these two effects, transitions from and
persistence in employment, unemployment, and sickness are examined separately.
Disability is considered an absorbing state, given that only a small number of
disability beneficiaries return to the labor force.
Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients on the year × treatment interaction
terms of equation (2) for transitions from and persistence in employment for all
three comparison groups. A 95-percent confidence interval is plotted with dotted
lines. The top left subfigure suggests that the 1996 reform led to a decrease in
direct exits from the labor market. There is evidence for an anticipation effect,
given that the estimated probability of a transition from employment to disability
is positive and significant just prior to the reform. As shown in the top right
subfigure, there is an increase in transitions from employment to unemployment.
Similarly, employed workers are more likely to seek SI benefits after the reform
in in effect (bottom left panel). Finally, the bottom right panel suggests that the
persistence in employment increased after this policy change.
Figure 5
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The estimated interaction term coefficients for transitions from and persis-
tence in unemployment are summarized in Figure 6. The top left subfigure sug-
gests a substantial and significant decline in the probability of a transition from
unemployment to disability after the policy reform is in effect, with little evi-
dence of a preexisting trend. However, as in the case of employment, there is an
increase in the number of transitions from unemployment to disability just prior
to the reform, suggesting some anticipation behavior. The drop in the number
of transitions from unemployment to disability is persistent over time and larger
in magnitude than the estimated decline for employment. This finding is consis-
tent with Autor and Duggan (2003) who show that the response to changes in
DI eligibility criteria is more elastic for the unemployed because they face low
opportunity costs of exiting the labor force to seek benefits than the employed.
Figure 6
The top right subfigure shows that after the change in the law the persistence
in unemployment increased in the treatment group relative to the comparison
groups. On the other hand, as shown in the bottom panels, the stricter eligibility
rules for disability benefits had no effect on transitions from the UI to the SI
program or into employment. The drop in the number of transitions from unem-
ployment to disability and the increased persistence in unemployment highlight
the role of the DI program in reducing measured unemployment.
The last set of results, summarized in Figure 7 explores transitions from sick-
ness into other states. The probability of a transition from sickness to disability
drops after the Structural Adjustment Act becomes effective (top left panel). On
the other hand, as displayed in the top right subfigure, there is a sizeable increase
in transitions to unemployment. Similarly, the bottom left panel indicates that
the the change in law increased the persistence in sickness. However, this effect
is not significantly different from 0 in most cases. Lastly, the bottom right panel
suggests that the change in law had no effect on transitions to employment.
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Figure 7
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 5-7 present estimates of the effects from the policy change for different
subsamples of individuals. Because health eligibility criteria for disability benefits
below the age threshold are more relaxed for white collar workers relative to
blue collar workers, it is instructive to examine the impact of the Structural
Adjustment Act for these two groups separately. OLS estimates of equation (1)
for blue and white collar workers are reported in Table 5. The first row indicates
that the reduction in disability was disproportionately large among blue collar
workers. For this group disability enrollment decreased in the order of 8.01 to
11.20 percentage points, compared to a decline of 1.26 to 1.62 percentage points
for white collar workers.
Interestingly, the pre-reform rate of DI receipt among 55-56 year old blue
collar workers averaged 4.5 times that of white collar workers of the same age.
The ratio is similar below age 55, despite of eligibility criteria being less strict
for white collar workers. For white collar workers the decline in disability is
completely absorbed by an increase in the inflow into the UI and SI program,
but had no effect on employment. Although for blue collar workers there is also
a sizeable substitution effect from disability into unemployment and the sickness
insurance program, employment increases by 2.68 to 5.95 percentage points after
the reform is in effect.
Table 5
As health plays an important role in the determination process for DI benefits,
Table 6 presents estimates of the effects from the policy change broken down by
health status. Health is measured by the time spent in sick leave in the 15 years
prior to age 49. An individuals is defined as healthy if he or she has not spent
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any time in sick leave through age 49 (roughly 60 percent of the sample). An
individual is defined as unhealthy if the time spent on sick leave in the 15 years
prior to age 49 is above the median time for individuals with positive sick leave
days.
As shown in the first row of Table 6, the reduction in DI enrollment is about
three times as large in absolute terms for unhealthy individuals than for healthy
individuals. The estimates in the remaining rows suggest that for unhealthy
individuals the policy change led to a substantial increase in employment despite
large spillover effects into the UI and SI program. For healthy individuals the
decline in DI enrollment is completely absorbed by an increase in unemployment
and sick leave.
Table 6
To further explore the heterogeneity in the effects from the policy change,
individuals are grouped into quintiles based on their lifetime earnings at age
49 (as measured by average earnings of the best 15 years) and then equation
(1) is estimated separately for each of the five quintiles of the lifetime earnings
distribution. The first row of Table 7 shows that for the lowest quintile of the
lifetime earnings distribution disability enrollment decreased by 11.97 percentage
points after this policy change. This is a sizeable decline which amounts to one
quarter of the baseline DI rate. The magnitude of the estimate decreases in
absolute terms for higher quintiles, but is constant in relative terms.
This finding is consistent with the evidence that the incentives to seek DI
benefits are higher with more generous income replacement rates (see, e.g., Autor
and Duggan (2003). In particular, because the DI benefit formula is concave
in past earnings and given that maximum DI benefits are truncated at a cap
of roughly 2,500 euros per month, high wage workers replace a lower share of
income.
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The remaining rows of Table 7 consider the effect of the reform on unem-
ployment, sickness, and employment for different quintiles of lifetime earnings.
The estimated coefficients indicate a significant increase in the unemployment
and sickness rate that is substantially larger among the lower quintiles of the
earnings distribution. The decline in disability is associated with a significant
increase in employment at the bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution.
Table 7
5.4 Financial Implications
The primary objective of the Structural Adjustment Act was to reduced expendi-
tures in the public pension system, by encouraging the labor force participation
of older male workers. The reform tightened the eligibility criteria for disability
benefits for older male workers aged 55 and 56; the main channel for early retire-
ment among elderly men. The results from the empirical analysis presented in
the previous sections suggest that the reform succeeded only partially in achiev-
ing this goal, given that the positive effect on employment was eroded by large
spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance programs.
Based on the estimation results, one can estimate the net budgetary savings of
the Structural Adjustment Act, as shown in Table 8. Because of the differential
impact of the reform for blue and white collar workers, these two groups are
separately treated. The change in individuals in Table 8 is based on the estimates
from Table 5 for the comparison group men aged 51-52. According to the first
row in Table 5 the share of blue collar disability recipients in the age group
55-56 decreased by 9.88 percentage points relative to the age group 51-52 after
the reform became effective. Combining this estimate with the average cohort
size of 55-56 year old blue collar individuals in the period 1998-1999 implies a
drop of 2,008 blue collar disability recipients each year (first column of Table 8).
Given that in the period after the reform the average blue collar DI beneficiary
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received 160 euros per week in benefits for a period of 47.7 weeks per year,
the reduction in government expenditure was 15.4 million euros per year. A
similar calculation for white collar individuals yields an additional 2.7 million
euros in averted pension payments. Moreover, as a result of the increase in
employment, the reform generated additional tax revenues of 4.6 million euros
per year from blue collar workers (column two). Since white collar employment
decreases slightly after the policy change, tax revenues from this group decline
by 0.9 million euros.
However, the savings in government expenditures are reduced by additional
expenditures in the UI and SI program due to spillover effects. In particular, the
number of blue collar UI recipients increased by 1,008 and the number of white
collar UI recipients by 362, as shown in column 3 of Table 8. Multiplying these
numbers with the average level of UI benefits and the average unemployment
duration implies that the policy change created additional expenditures in the
UI program of 6 million euros per year for blue collar men and 3.2 million euros per
year for white collar men. In addition, as shown in column 4, total SI expenditures
increased by 0.5 million euros per year after the reform was put in place. Overall
the stricter criteria for disability insurance reduced the government budget deficit
by 12.1 million euros per year.
Table 8
6 Conclusion
Relying on a large policy change in Austria, this paper analyzed the impact of
a tightening in DI eligibility rules on the labor supply of older workers. Similar
to other industrialized countries, the disability insurance program in Austria is
an important channel for early retirement, especially because conditions to be
classified as disabled are substantially relaxed for older workers aged 55 and above.
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With the aim of improving the fiscal health of the public pension system, the
Austrian government enacted in 1996 the Structural Adjustment Act. The most
significant change of this legislation was a two-year increase in the age, at which
eligibility rules for disability benefits are relaxed. Since disability enrollment is
particularly high among older men, this increase applied only to men.
Relying on a difference-in-difference approach and using data on the universe
of Austrian private sector workers, the empirical analysis suggests that stricter
eligibility rules have a significant impact on disability enrollment. Specifically,
the share of disability recipients in the affected age group decreased by 6 to 7.2
percentage points after the reform was implemented. The empirical analysis also
suggests that any change in the disability insurance program may affect enroll-
ment in other government programs that provide income replacement in the case
of a separation from the labor market for economic or health reasons. Specifi-
cally, the share of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased by 3.2
to 3.9 percentage points and the share receiving sickness insurance benefits by
roughly 0.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the estimates indicate that
employment increased by 1.7 to 3.4 percentage points after this policy change.
The estimates also suggest that the impact of the reform varies with individ-
ual characteristics, with blue collar, unhealthy and low earning workers showing
larger responses than white collar, healthy and high earning workers.
The DI program is a large and growing social insurance program in most
industrialized countries. Thus, understanding how changes in DI program pa-
rameters affect labor supply is extremely important for policy makers. One way
to control the size and growth of the DI program is through stricter access to
benefits. The estimates presented in this paper suggest that tightening eligibil-
ity criteria has a large effect on DI enrollment and are effective in increasing
employment, despite large absorption effects by the UI and SI programs.
There is evidence that the demand for DI benefits depends crucially on labor–
market conditions (Autor and Duggan (2003)). An examination of workers’
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records prior to the inflow into the disability insurance highlights that a large
fraction is unemployed before claiming disability benefits. Thus, the large in-
creases in the unemployment and sickness rate after the change in eligibility rules
may also be the consequence of poor labor market prospects for older workers
that are still capable of working. More work on the employability of older workers
is an important topic for future research.
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Table 1: Net replacement rates in different social insurance programs among
males by age groups
Age group Disability Insurance Sickness Insurance Unemployment Insurance
49-50 54.5 64.1 54.6
51-52 57.3 64.1 55.1
53-54 59.8 64.1 55.6
55-56 62.9 64.0 55.3
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data
Table 2: Health-related eligibility criteria for DI benefits for different groups
Age Blue collar White collar
Age < 55 50% reduction in work ability in 50% reduction in work ability in any
any reasonable occupation occupation belonging to the same
occupational group
Age ≥ 55 50 % reduction in work ability in 50% reduction in work ability in
a similar occupation a similar occupation
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Table 3: Sample statistics by age groups before and after the 1996 reform
Ages 49-50 Ages 51-52 Ages 53-54 Ages 55-56
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Labor market states (%)
Disability 5.20 5.71 7.22 7.68 10.51 10.37 23.24 18.19
Unemployment 8.20 9.48 9.95 10.98 11.93 12.97 10.03 14.04
Sickness 1.20 1.22 1.27 1.34 1.42 1.53 1.04 1.59
Employment 84.04 82.52 79.68 78.34 74.04 73.21 63.32 64.03
Residual 1.36 1.07 1.88 1.66 2.10 1.92 2.37 2.15
Background characteristics
Blue collar 0.549 0.573 0.534 0.562 0.547 0.545 0.579 0.547
Sick days 46.02 50.49 41.10 47.42 37.88 42.77 39.66 38.33
Experience 13.39 13.31 13.32 13.15 13.22 12.96 12.97 12.71
Contribution years 13.40 13.55 15.03 15.08 16.79 16.55 18.19 18.05
Annual earnings 31,064 31,582 30,769 31,299 30,233 31,008 29,194 30,631
Average earnings 22,340 21,777 22,593 22,144 22,428 22,536 21,752 22,592
Number of 261,611 300,613 311,487 305,028 355,443 330,207 335,010 386,340
observations
Notes: Before refers to the period January 1994 to August 1996. After denotes the period
September 1996 to December 1999. Experience denotes experience in the last 15 years, sick
days is the sum of days spent in sick leave prior to age 49, and average earnings is the average
annual earnings over the best 15 years. Annual earnings and average earnings are measured at
age 49 and adjusted for inflation.
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Table 4: Impact of reform on disability, unemployment, sickness, and employment
Base specification Without transition years
49-50 51-52 53-54 49-50 51-52 53-54
Disability
Post×Treat -5.30*** -5.00*** -4.30*** -7.44*** -6.58*** -5.98***
(0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26)
Treat 14.38*** 12.53*** 10.25*** 13.96*** 12.06*** 9.82***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
R2 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.289 0.289 0.290
Mean 23.29 22.63
Unemployment
Post×Treat 2.44*** 2.91*** 2.93*** 3.45*** 3.79*** 3.92***
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.27) (0.24)
Treat 0.15 -1.56*** -3.10*** 0.27 -1.47*** -2.97***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15)
R2 0.143 0.143 0.149 0.150 0.151 0.155
Mean 10.04 9.93
Sickness
Post×Treat 0.60*** 0.57*** 0.47*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.57***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Treat -0.33*** -0.41*** -0.48*** -0.34*** -0.41*** -0.46***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.015
Mean 1.04 1.10
Employment
Post×Treat 2.34*** 1.60*** 1.04*** 3.37*** 2.21*** 1.61***
(0.22) (0.24) (0.21) (0.28) (0.30) (0.26)
Treat -14.64*** -10.55*** -6.70*** -14.39*** -10.27*** -6.48***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.23) (0.21) (0.18)
R2 0.483 0.484 0.494 0.484 0.483 0.494
Mean 63.29 63.94
Observations 1,283,574 1,337,865 1,407,000 824,286 881,394 914,166
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. Details on the specifications
are provided in the main text. The time period is 1994-1999 for the base specification. Without
transition years excludes observations from 1996 and 1997. Reported means are for the age
group 55-56 over the pre-reform period. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 5: Impact of reform for blue collar and white collar workers
Blue collar White collar
49-50 51-52 53-54 49-50 51-52 53-54
Disability
Post×Treat -11.20*** -9.88*** -8.91*** -1.62*** -1.55*** -1.26***
(0.42) (0.46) (0.40) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)
Treat 19.57*** 17.21*** 14.10*** 4.85*** 4.13*** 3.17***
(0.32) (0.30) (0.27) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
R2 0.308 0.304 0.298 0.151 0.153 0.157
Mean 33.31 7.45
Unemployment
Post×Treat 4.11*** 4.96*** 5.46*** 2.29*** 2.00*** 1.60***
(0.37) (0.40) (0.36) (0.31) (0.33) (0.30)
Treat -0.63** -3.00*** -5.07*** 2.60*** 1.35*** 0.29
(0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.19)
R2 0.134 0.131 0.134 0.186 0.192 0.200
Mean 11.46 7.75
Sickness
Post×Treat 1.17*** 1.08*** 0.93*** 0.13** 0.21*** 0.14**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Treat -0.66*** -0.72*** -0.78*** -0.02 -0.10*** -0.08**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
R2 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.006
Mean 1.63 0.35
Employment
Post×Treat 5.95*** 3.82*** 2.68*** -0.77** -0.48 -0.42
(0.41) (0.44) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34)
Treat -18.84*** -13.48*** -8.29*** -8.08*** -5.74*** -3.69***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.25) (0.29) (0.27) (0.23)
R2 0.474 0.463 0.469 0.407 0.417 0.432
Mean 51.40 81.74
Observations 463,373 491,165 509,886 360,913 390,229 404,280
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors
are multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include
controls for experience, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15
years, number of days spent in sick leave through age 49, industry and region dummies, and
regional GDP growth rate. Annual earnings and average earnings are measured at age 49 and
adjusted for inflation. The pre-period is 1994-1995 and the post period is 1998-1999. Reported
means are for age group 55-56 over the pre-reform period. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** =
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Table 6: Impact of reform for unhealthy and healthy individuals
Unhealthy Healthy
49-50 51-52 53-54 49-50 51-52 53-54
Disability
Post×Treat -12.39*** -10.87*** -9.70*** -3.94*** -3.49*** -3.28***
(0.87) (0.94) (0.77) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Treat 22.65*** 18.83*** 15.49*** 7.99*** 7.20*** 6.02***
(0.62) (0.57) (0.49) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19)
R2 0.297 0.304 0.309 0.190 0.180 0.180
Mean 43.54 12.00
Unemployment
Post×Treat 4.13*** 4.65*** 5.31*** 2.65*** 2.74*** 2.67***
(0.76) (0.82) (0.69) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27)
Treat -4.80*** -5.21*** -6.05*** 1.97*** 0.19 -1.36***
(0.51) (0.48) (0.41) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
R2 0.125 0.124 0.119 0.157 0.162 0.179
Mean 12.85 8.02
Sickness
Post×Treat 1.14*** 1.25*** 1.17*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.30***
(0.27) (0.24) (0.23) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Treat -2.42*** -1.69*** -1.38*** 0.13*** -0.05 -0.10**
(0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
R2 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013
Mean 1.76 0.70
Employment
Post×Treat 7.05*** 5.11*** 3.29*** 0.77** 0.34 0.38
(0.73) (0.73) (0.61) (0.33) (0.36) (0.32)
Treat -15.81*** -12.07*** -8.16*** -10.57*** -7.41*** -4.62***
(0.57) (0.51) (0.41) (0.27) (0.26) (0.22)
R2 0.466 0.485 0.502 0.398 0.394 0.414
Mean 40.31 76.49
Observations 163,940 172,853 178,202 492,909 532,948 553,882
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls
for blue collar status, experience, insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the
best 15 years, industry and region dummies, and regional GDP growth rate. Annual earnings
and average earnings are measured at age 49 and adjusted for inflation. The pre-period is
1994-1995 and the post period is 1998-1999. Reported means are for age group 55-56 over the
pre-reform period. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 7: Impact of reform by quintiles of earnings over the best 15 years
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Disability
Post×Treat -11.97*** -8.12*** -5.70*** -4.07*** -0.59***
(0.91) (0.72) (0.63) (0.52) (0.20)
Treat 20.66*** 15.48*** 10.86*** 7.80*** 1.47***
(0.57) (0.49) (0.43) (0.36) (0.14)
R2 0.267 0.283 0.274 0.222 0.073
Mean 43.40 30.43 22.35 14.86 2.10
Unemployment
Post×Treat 6.51*** 4.91*** 3.45*** 1.91*** -0.08
(0.82) (0.62) (0.59) (0.52) (0.29)
Treat -6.35*** -2.25*** -0.12 1.76*** 1.53***
(0.48) (0.40) (0.40) (0.36) (0.19)
R2 0.120 0.130 0.155 0.171 0.089
Mean 14.22 10.39 11.53 10.53 2.98
Sickness
Post×Treat 1.17*** 0.80*** 0.72*** 0.61*** 0.10*
(0.22) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.06)
Treat -1.39*** -0.63*** -0.16 -0.15* 0.06**
(0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03)
R2 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.009
Mean 1.70 1.55 1.24 0.86 0.14
Employment
Post×Treat 4.45*** 2.62*** 1.61** 1.98*** 0.83**
(0.80) (0.72) (0.66) (0.59) (0.39)
Treat -12.65*** -12.70*** -10.60*** -9.87*** -3.89***
(0.54) (0.52) (0.49) (0.44) (0.26)
R2 0.402 0.424 0.463 0.459 0.286
Mean 39.92 55.93 62.09 70.22 92.52
Observations 176,264 176,289 176,273 176,239 176,329
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 and should be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls
for blue collar status, experience, insurance years, annual earnings, number of days spent in sick
leave through age 49, industry and region dummies, and regional GDP growth rate. Annual
earnings is measured at age 49 and adjusted for inflation. The pre-period is 1994-1995 and
the post period is 1998-1999. Reported means are for the age group 55-56 over the pre-reform
period. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
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Table 8: Cost-benefit analysis
∆ DI ∆ tax ∆ UI ∆ SI
expenditures revenues expenditures expenditures
Blue collar
∆ individuals -2,008 776 1,008 219
Avg. duration (weeks) 47.7 42.0 36.0 11.1
Weekly avg. transfer (2002 euros) 160 142 165 165
Annual ∆ total (million euros) -15.4 4.6 6.0 0.4
White collar
∆ individuals -280 -87 362 38
Avg. duration (weeks) 46.9 48.6 41.7 9.4
Weekly avg. transfer (2002 euros) 202 204 213 230
Annual ∆ total (million euros) -2.7 -0.9 3.2 0.1
Notes: ∆ individuals is calculated based on the estimates in Table 5 for the comparison group
men 51-52 and the average cohort size of 55-56 year olds in the period 1998-1999 with blue
collar and white collar status, respectively. DI benefits, UI benefits, SI benefits are net of taxes.
36
2
4
6
8
10
Pe
rc
en
t
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
Age
before after
Men
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
Pe
rc
en
t
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
Age
before after
Women
Figure 1: New enrolles to the DI program by age and gender before (Jan 1994–
Aug 1996) and after (Sep 1996–Dec 1999) the reform is in effect
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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Figure 2: Trends in disability, unemployment, sickness, and employment over the
period 1991-2002 among males in different age groups
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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Figure 3: Percent of men receiving DI benefits by age, 1994 and 1999
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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Figure 4: Coefficients of the interaction year × treatment in equation (2) for
different states with 95-percent confidence interval
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Figure 5: Coefficients of the interaction year × treatment in equation (2) for
transitions from employment with 95-percent confidence interval
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Figure 6: Coefficients of the interaction year × treatment in equation (2) for
transitions from unemployment with 95-percent confidence interval
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Figure 7: Coefficients of the interaction year × treatment in equation (2) for
transitions from sickness with 95-percent confidence interval
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